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This paper presents the first criminological analysis of an online social reaction to a crime event 
of national significance, in particular the detection and propagation of cyberhate on social media 
following a terrorist attack. We take the Woolwich, London terrorist attack in 2013 as our event 
of interest and draw on Cohen’s process of warning, impact, inventory and reaction to delineate a 
sequence of incidents that come to constitute a series of deviant responses following the attack. This 
paper adds to contemporary debates in criminology and the study of hate crime in three ways: (1) 
it provides the first analysis of the escalation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of cyberhate 
in social media following a terrorist event; (2) it applies Cohen’s work on action, reaction and 
amplification and the role of the traditional media to the online context and (3) it introduces and 
provides a case study in ‘computational criminology’.
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Introduction
Recent research has shown that the prevalence and severity of offline crimes with a prej-
udicial component are influenced in the short term by singular or clusters of events. 
In particular, terrorist acts have been found to function as antecedent ‘trigger’ events 
that ‘validate’ prejudicial sentiments and tensions, opening up a space for the spread 
of hostile beliefs and the mobilization of action as a result of the desire for retribution 
in the targeted group. This can manifest in the amplification or escalation of devi-
ance towards groups that share similar characteristics to the perceived terrorist per-
petrators. A focus on events has allowed researchers to study the escalation, duration, 
diffusion and de-escalation of offline hate crimes (Legewie 2013; Hanes and Machin 
2014; King and Sutton 2014). While the evidence from these studies is compelling, they 
say little about the ebb and flow of contemporary forms of hate that manifest online. 
Despite cyberhate being evident from the birth of the domestic Internet (initially with 
the launch of the Stormfront website in 19951), it has only recently become identified as 
a social problem that requires addressing. The prominence of the problem is linked to 
the recognition that contemporary online spaces, such as social media platforms (e.g. 
Twitter), now represent a socio-technical assemblage that creates a new public sphere 
enabling digital citizenship through which key aspects of civil society are played out 
(Mossberger et al. 2008). The former UK Justice Secretary Chris Grayling announced 
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plans in 2014 to amend the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill to increase the maximum 
sentence for online abusive and hateful content from 6 to 24 months. Despite this rec-
ognition, almost all the evidence on the manifestation and prevalence of cyberhate is 
anecdotal. No research to date has empirically studied the propagation of cyberhate; the 
escalation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of hate speech on computer networks.
This paper presents an analysis of cyberhate in social media networks following a ‘trig-
ger’ event. Open and widely accessible social media technologies, such as Twitter, are 
increasingly being used by citizens on a global scale to publish content in reaction to real-
world events. The rapid uptake of these technologies has resulted in a massive distributed 
‘social sensor net’ that affords criminologists with the opportunity to identify, monitor 
and trace social reactions to events to the second in real time. The diffusion of informa-
tion in these networks following events can manifest itself in a number of ways, ranging 
from support of social resilience through calls for assistance and advice (Morell et al. 
2011) to the socially disruptive, through the production and contagion of misinformation 
and antagonistic and prejudiced commentary (Williams et al. 2013; Burnap et al. 2014). 
We take the murder of Lee Rigby in the terrorist attack in Woolwich, London in 2013 as 
our event of interest to study the manifestation, prevalence and propagation of cyberhate. 
We draw on Cohen’s (1972) notion of action, reaction and amplification by applying the 
process of warning, impact, inventory and reaction to delineate a sequence of incidents 
that come to constitute a series of deviant social responses following the Woolwich terror 
attack. A computational criminological treatment of this process is possible through the 
collection and analysis of social media communications that are more voluminous and 
rapidly and continuously produced than newspaper headlines, interviews or surveys. Like 
Cohen, we advance the argument that the social response to an event is partly responsible 
for deepening its impact or causing new events through the cyclical process of action, 
reaction and amplification and postulate that social media reactions have the potential 
to act as a ‘force amplifier’ in contemporary forms of social response. This paper adds 
to contemporary debates in criminology and the study of hate in three distinct ways: 
(1) it provides the first analysis of the escalation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation 
of cyberhate in social media following a trigger event; (2) it applies Cohen’s work on 
action, reaction and amplification and the role of the traditional media to the online 
social media context and (3) it introduces and provides a case study in ‘computational 
criminology’ using Big Social Data. At the time of writing, this paper represents the first 
criminological analysis of an online social reaction to a major crime event, in particular 
the detection and propagation of cyberhate on social media following a terrorist attack.
The manifestation and harms of cyberhate
Cyberhate2 has manifested in online communications in various contexts since the 
Internet became popular among the general population in the mid-1990s (Williams 
2006; Wall and Williams 2007). Defining cyberhate (in particular hate speech) is com-
plex given cultural and linguistic variations. However, legal scholars have focussed 
on the expressive value of language in their attempts to classify hateful speech. The 
2 The practice of ‘trolling’ (the targeting of defamatory and antagonistic messages towards users of social media) has received 
press attention of late. We avoid using the term in this paper as it can encapsulate broader forms of online abuse not restricted 
to victims with minority or protected characteristics.
WILLIAMS AND BURNAP
212
 by guest on February 8, 2016
http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
definition adopted in this study emanates from Greenawalt (1989) who states that any 
analysis of the law in regard to hate speech offline has to consider the extent to which 
this language has expressive value. He considers four criteria that might make such 
expressions criminal: (1) that they might provoke a response of violence; (2) that they 
may deeply wound those at whom the speech is directed; (3) that such speech causes 
offence to those that hear it and (4) that slurs and epithets have a degrading effect on 
social relationships within any one community. Several of these conditions are encap-
sulated within UK provisions including the Public Order Act of 1986, the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998. The application of these laws and others that criminalize incite-
ment on the basis of religion and sexual orientation3 to the online context is relatively 
non-contentious as evidenced by several recent high profile social media cyberhate 
cases (see next section).
Despite these provisions, for over a decade much cyberhate that manifested online (pre-
social media) met with little criminal justice response in the United Kingdom. Further 
afield, in countries like the United States, cyberhate continues largely unchallenged by 
law enforcement due to freedom of speech protections. Levin (2002) studied how US 
right-wing groups promoted their goals on the web largely unchallenged by law enforce-
ment, concluding that the online medium has been useful to hatemongers because it is 
economic, far reaching and protected by the First Amendment. Perry and Olsson (2009) 
found that the web created a new common space that fostered a ‘collective identity’ for 
previously fractured hate groups, strengthening their domestic presence in counties such 
as the United States, Germany and Sweden. They warn a ‘global racist subculture’ could 
emerge if cyberhate is left unchallenged. Eichhorn (2001) focuses on how the online 
environment opens up the possibility for a more immediate and radical recontextualiza-
tion of hate speech, while also highlighting its affordances for more effective modes of 
response, such as vigilantism and counter-speech. Leets (2001) in a study of the impacts 
of hate-related web pages found that respondents perceived the content of these sites as 
having an indirect but insidious threat, while Oksanen et al. (2014) show how 67 per cent 
of 15- to 18-year olds in their study had been exposed to hate material on Facebook and 
YouTube, with 21 per cent becoming victims of such material. This final study evidences 
how the rise of social media platforms has been accompanied by an exponential increase 
in cyberhate (see also Williams and Wall 2013).
Conceptual Framework
Antecedent or ‘trigger’ events and social media reactions
Historically criminologists have been preoccupied with where crimes take place. An 
abundance of research, particularly in the United States, focuses upon the spatial clus-
tering of crimes in so-called hotspots, where reportedly over half of recorded crimes 
occur (Braga et al. 2012). Fewer studies have taken as their focus when crimes occur. 
Arguably, this is a result of a lack of fine-grained data on the temporal dimension 
of crime. Given the problems associated with interviewer recall, retrospective victimi-
zation surveys understandably neglect to ask detailed questions on the times crimes 
occurred. Police-recorded crime data may not accurately reflect the time of occurrence 
3 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2008 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
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and are impoverished due to low reporting levels of hate crime (Williams and Tregidga 
2014). It is also rare for researchers to gain access to such fine-grained data. Given this 
lack of data, and where they do exist difficulties of access, there is limited research on 
singular or clusters of events and their influence on the prevalence of hate crimes in 
the short term. Of what research exists, the focus has been upon acts of terrorism. On 
a European scale, Legewie (2013) established a significant association between anti-
immigrant sentiment and the Bali terrorist bombing using Eurobarometer data. The 
usability of this data set to establish this correlation was dependent upon chance, as 
the terrorist event occurred during fieldwork, allowing a pre–post intervention design. 
King and Sutton (2014) found an association between terrorist acts and a rise in hate 
crime incidents in the United States. Convincingly, they show that following the 9/11 
terrorist attack law enforcement agencies recorded 481 hate crimes with a specific anti-
Islamic motive, with 58 per cent of these occurring within two weeks of the attack (4 per 
cent of the at-risk period of 12 months). In the United Kingdom, Hanes and Machin 
(2014) found significant increases in hate crimes reported to the police in London fol-
lowing 9/11 and 7/7. These latter two studies were reliant upon police-recorded hate 
crime data, and both sets of authors acknowledge the significant problems of non-
reporting and lack of temporal granularity. The first two studies found that a sharp 
de-escalation was evident following the spike in hate crimes following the trigger event, 
indicating that event-specific motivated hate has a ‘half-life’. These authors conclude 
hate crimes cluster in time and tend to increase, sometimes dramatically, in the after-
math of antecedent ‘trigger’ or galvanizing events, such as terrorist acts. They postulate 
that hate crimes are communicative acts, often provoked by events that incite a desire 
for retribution in the targeted group, towards the group that share similar characteris-
tics to the perpetrators.
A focus on the temporal dimension of hate crimes allows for a study of their esca-
lation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation following trigger events. However, as 
noted previously, there are limitations in offline data: (1) low temporal granularity; 
(2) issues with under reporting in official police data (particularly in the case of hate 
crimes) and (3) the retrospective nature of reporting and problems with witness and 
victim recall. Forms of naturally occurring online data, such as social media com-
munications, while noisy and unstructured, lend themselves to temporal analysis. 
This is primarily due to the time-stamps that accompany all items of online social 
media communication. Further, researchers have argued that users of social media 
act like a distributed sensor network, often identifying events before the authorities 
and traditional media (Sakaki et al. 2010). Furthermore, users of social media are 
more likely to express emotional content due to phenomena such as deindividuation 
(Williams 2006). Therefore, we argue that following trigger events, such as terrorists 
acts, social media users are often first publish a reaction, and given there are now over 
2.5 billion users of social media (Smith 2014), these online communications provide 
rapid (to the second) insight into social reaction on an unprecedented scale. Indeed, 
there is evidence to support this argument in the recent high profile prosecution of 
social media users who posted negative emotive reactions following various events. For 
example, in 2012, Liam Stacey was sentenced to 56 days in prison for posting racist 
comments on Twitter after footballer’s cardiac arrest and Daniel Thomas was arrested 
after a homophobic message was sent to Olympic diver Tom Daley. In 2014, Isabella 
Sorley, John Nimmo and Peter Nunn were jailed for abusing feminist campaigner 
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Caroline Criado-Perez and MP Stella Creasy, and Declan McCuish was jailed for a year 
for tweeting racist comments about two Rangers Football Club players. In relation to 
the Woolwich terrorist attack, seven social media users were arrested after posting 
messages that were suspected of inciting racial or religious hatred (BBC 2013). While 
these examples of ‘extreme’ cyberhate are relatively rare, tens of thousands of other 
users posted less extreme hateful content in relation to these events, creating a dataset 
that can be subject to criminological inspection. What is particularly unique about 
social media communications, when compared to more traditional interviews or sur-
vey methods, is that the user posts can be endorsed and spread by other users (in the 
case of Twitter ‘retweeted’), creating an information flow or propagation network that 
can be studied. For example, researchers can use such networks to identify what infor-
mation or sentiment is being endorsed and propagated by users, and which users have 
the most or least influence in the spread of such messages. This locomotive, extensive 
and linked dimension of social media data allows criminologists to study the fine-
grained (i.e. seconds instead of days, months or years) escalation, duration, diffusion 
and de-escalation of social reaction following events, often far in advance of research 
using conventional curated or administrative data.
These data therefore afford us with the possibility of computationally reconfiguring 
classic criminological theory. For example, in the study of action, reaction and amplifica-
tion, Cohen (1972) outlined a process of warning, impact, inventory and reaction to delin-
eate a sequence of incidents that come to constitute a deviant event or series of events. 
A computational criminological approach to this process is possible through the collec-
tion and analysis of social media communications that are more voluminous and rapidly 
and continuously produced than newspaper headlines, interviews or surveys. If, as Cohen 
suggests, the social response to an event is partly responsible for deepening its impact or 
causing new events through the cyclical process of action, reaction and amplification, 
then social media reactions have the potential to act as a force amplifier. The dynamics 
and features of this amplifier effect are directly observable in real time (down to the sec-
ond) given the digital traces left behind by new ‘online publics’. The initial transmission 
(in the case of Twitter, an original tweet) and subsequent diffusion (a retweet, considered 
an endorsement)4 of a social media reaction can be used to gauge a ‘warning stage’—
tensions and sentiments expressed ‘based on conditions out of which danger may arise’ 
(1972: 22). Here, we may take as an example the general state of insecurity concerning 
the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom that may foster social media communications 
around potential associated risks. Following, the ‘impact stage’ ‘during which the disas-
ter strikes and the immediate unorganised response to the death, injury and destruction 
takes place’ (in our example, the killing of Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013), social media 
communications are likely to spike, and further again in the ‘inventory stage’ ‘during 
which those exposed to the disaster begin to form a preliminary picture of what has 
happened and of their own condition’. Original tweeters (and their retweeters) in these 
stages struggle to comprehend and clarify the impact, drawing comparisons with similar 
events in the past and making spurious links with potential perpetrator groups and pos-
sible motives. It is important to note that tweeters include individual citizens, groups and 
organizations; and media, government and police communications play a significant part 
in these stages, either appealing for information or attempting to shape reactions (e.g. 
4 Unless altered by the retweeter to convey their alternative view-point, then considered a modified retweet.
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dispelling or fuelling rumours and speculation). During the ‘reaction stage’, where the 
‘images in the inventory [are] crystallized into more organised opinions and attitudes’ 
social media communications focus less upon the event itself and more upon the wider 
implications and the ‘issues’—domestic security, war in the Middle East and so on. Social 
media communications also reveal the extent to which ‘online publics’ become sensitized 
to individuals and groups associated with the event or implicated by it. This sensitization 
may represent itself as expressions in tweets of the overestimation of an increased risk 
of deviance and calls for an escalation of social control. Finally, a point of clear impor-
tance to this current paper, the social media reaction may affect the nature, extent and 
development of deviant activity from spectators, especially during the impact phase. In 
particular, contagion fuelled by ‘rumours and the milling process’ (1972: 19) in online 
social networks ‘validate’ sentiments and tensions, opening up a space for the galvaniz-
ing and spread of hostile beliefs and the mobilization of action as a result of the desire 
for retribution in the targeted group, manifesting in the escalation of deviance towards 
groups that share similar characteristics to the perceived perpetrators.
In this study, we examine the emergence and propagation of cyberhate following the 
Woolwich terror attack using part of Cohen’s framework: impact, inventory and early 
reaction. We focus upon the Twitter social media network (see Data and Methods for the 
rationale) and analyse approximately half a million tweets two weeks following the event. 
We take as our focus cyberhate, and not offline hate crimes and incidents, which previ-
ous research and initial evidence show increased following the attack (see Feldman and 
Littler 2014; Hanes and Machin 2014). At the time of writing, this paper represents the first 
criminological analysis of an online social reaction to a major crime event, in particular 
the detection and propagation of cyberhate on social media following a terrorist attack.
Hypotheses
H1:  The Woolwich terrorist attack will act as an antecedent trigger event for the publication of cyber-
hate on the Twitter social media network.
By examining the presence of cyberhate tied to the Woolwich event using a bespoke 
hate speech supervised machine classifier (see Burnap and Williams 2015), this first 
hypothesis extends the work of Legewie (2013), King and Sutton (2014) and Hanes and 
Machin (2014) that evidences offline hate incidents and crimes increase following a ter-
rorist antecedent ‘trigger’ event as they operate to galvanize tensions and sentiments 
against the suspected perpetrators and groups associated with them.
H2: Agent Type will be significantly predictive of the production of cyberhate.
The second hypothesis tests whether the type of tweeter (media, police, political, far 
right political) is predictive of the production of cyberhate. We make no assumptions 
about the direction of associations due to a lack of previous research.
H3:  The number of news headlines relating to the event will be positively associated with the produc-
tion of cyberhate.
If, as Cohen suggests, the traditional media play a role in ‘setting the agenda’, ‘transmitting 
the images’ and ‘claims making’ following deviant events of national interest, we antici-
pate a positive correlation between the number of news headlines and the production 
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of a deviant social reaction to the perpetrators and those that share similar individual 
characteristics (ethnicity, religion, etc.).
H4:  Cyberhate will propagate in size during the impact stage, will begin to abate during the inventory 
stage and will die out in the reaction stage following the attack.
H5:  Cyberhate will survive over time during the impact stage, will begin to abate during the inventory 
stage and will die out in the reaction stage following the attack.
The fourth and fifth hypotheses examine a propagation dimension by postulating cyberhate 
will spread as a result of contagion via ‘rumours and the milling process’ (Cohen 1972: 
19) facilitated by the act of retweeting. Two propagation dimensions are tested: size and 
survivability over time. In particular, they test whether the diffusion of cyberhate is con-
fined to Cohen’s impact and inventory stages. During the impact stage, social media com-
munications are likely to spike where online publics struggle to comprehend and clarify the 
impact, drawing comparisons with similar events in the past and making spurious links with 
potential perpetrator groups and possible motives, opening up a space for the germination 
of hate. During the inventory and reaction stages, details emerge of the victim, perpetra-
tor and motive via official channels (media, police, government), and discussion moves on 
from the actors to issues, opening up a space for the countering of rumour and hate. These 
hypotheses also test whether the ‘half-life’ found in offline hate incident patterns following 
antecedent events also applies to cyberhate (Legewie 2013; King and Sutton 2014).
H6:  Tweets emanating from particular Agents will be significantly predictive of information flow size 
and survival.
The final hypothesis tests whether the type of tweeter is predictive of the spread of 
non-cyberhate-related information following the event. Little is currently known about 
the relative influence of actors in social media networks on the flow of information 
following terrorist events. Therefore, this hypothesis tests the assumption that informa-
tion emanating from some agents will spread significantly more in terms of size and 
survival, compared to other agents.
Data and Methods
Big ‘social’ data and computational criminology
The exponential growth and uptake of social media and the availability of vast amounts of 
information from these networks as interactional data to researchers has created a funda-
mental methodological and technical challenge for social science. The collection, analysis 
and representation of data for this study required collaboration with computer scientists to 
deal with the six Vs of Big Data: volume, variety, velocity, veracity, virtue and value (see Burnap 
et al. 2014; 2015; Williams et al. 2013). The authors consisting of a criminologist and a com-
puter scientist developed an interdisciplinary methodology, dubbed computational criminology, 
that has its roots in computational social science (Edwards et al. 2013). Savage and Burrows 
(2007) argue that corporate giants such as Facebook, Google and Twitter have been using 
advanced computing to mine and interpret naturally occurring social data for half a decade. 
Until recently, social scientists in academia have been left behind, in an ‘empirical crisis’, lack-
ing the access, infrastructure and skills to marshal these data. This paper is one of the first to 
report on the analysis of social media data using advanced computing techniques to answer 
a classic criminological question on social reactions to criminal events of national interest.
CYBERHATE ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WOOLWICH
217
 by guest on February 8, 2016
http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
Data
The data collection period spanned a month following the terrorist event in Woolwich. 
Data were derived from the Twitter social media network. This network differs from 
others such as Facebook, in that it is public and the data are freely accessible by 
researchers. Twitter also has an open friendship network (non-reciprocal linking 
between users means that the followed are not required to follow their followers) 
resulting in a digital ‘public agora’ that promotes the free exchange of opinions and 
ideas. As a result, Twitter has become the primary space for online citizens to pub-
licly express their reaction to events of national significance. A hashtag convention 
has emerged among Twitter users that allows tweets to be tagged to a topic that is 
searchable. The term ‘trending’ is used to describe hashtags that become popular 
within the tweet-stream, indicating a peak or pulse in discussion usually surrounding 
an event. Data were collected via the Twitter streaming Application Programming 
Interface based on a manual inspection of the highest trending keyword following 
the event (i.e. ‘Woolwich’), the most common strategy in the field of information dif-
fusion online (Yang and Counts 2010). This strategy produces robust samples due to 
the interactive nature of keywords and hashtags, where followers of events on Twitter 
actively seek out the most popular, or trending topics/hashtags in order to identify 
relevant information and subsequently add to the flow by replicating the keyword 
or hashtag in their posts. This selection procedure generates a census of tweets con-
taining the most common keyword, and hence a large sample of all tweets about 
the event in question. An examination of web search trends using the ‘Woolwich’ 
keyword to query the Google Trends service indicated that an issue attention cycle 
around this event (the duration within which public attention to this event rises and 
falls away) spanned 15 days. This time window also maps onto the combined dura-
tions of Cohen’s (1972) warning, impact and early reaction phases in our data set (see 
frequency distribution in Figure 4). This became the analysis sampling time frame 
for our study, during which we collected N = 427,330 tweets. The sample was subject 
to data preprocessing and recoding using high performance computational infra-
structure prior to modelling. Given our sampling technique ensured the collection of 
all tweets containing the most popular term surrounding the event for 15 days, we are 
confident that the sample is representative of non-trivial information flows on Twitter.
Information propagation models
Dependent measures
We took the frequency of retweets of an original tweet surrounding the event as a size of 
information flow-dependent measure, and the duration between the first and last retweet as 
a survival of information flow-dependent measure. In terms of size, the number of retweets 
is a measure of public interest and endorsement of the information, while survival (or 
duration) is a measure of persistence of interest over time. This is consistent with previ-
ous work on modelling information diffusion in social networks (Yang and Counts 2010) 
(see Table 1).
Independent measures
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the independent measures that were input into 
the models. Several Content Factors were incorporated, including the sentiment expressed 
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(using the established Sentistrength tool, Thelwall et al. 2010), the expression of hate-
ful terms (see cyberhate models below) and the presence of hashtags and URLs (both 
of which improve discoverability and information sharing, Yang and Counts 2010). Social 
Factors of Twitter users were input, including type of tweeter (police, media, etc.), number 
of followers and total number of previous tweets. Frequencies of news stories that were 
published each day that included the term ‘Woolwich’ in the headline and Google Search 
Trends for the same keyword were both entered as External Factors. Based on previous 
research, we identified several Control Factors (time of day and day of week) that have been 
shown to influence the propagation of information flows in social media (Zarrella 2009).
Cyberhate model
Dependent measure
We entered cyberhate as a dependent measure in a third model to examine the fea-
tures that enabled and inhibited hateful information flows (see Table 1). We built a 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics (N = 210,807)
Variables Coding Sample
M SD
Dependent variables
 Size (retweets) Range: 0–4,079 0.39 11.92
 Survival (seconds) Range: 0–1,295,876 2,399.80 27,416.34
 Extremity of cyberhate 0 = none; 1 = moderate; 2 = extreme 0.01 0.10
Independent variables
 Content factors
  Sentiment −1 = negative; 0 = neutral; 1 = positive −0.59 0.66
  Hashtag 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.33 0.47
  URL 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.61 0.49
 Social factors
  News Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.05 0.22
  Police Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.01 0.02
  Political Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.01 0.03
  Far Right Political Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.01 0.06
  Other Agent 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.94 0.23
  Followers Range: 0–8,820,174 6,030.70 109,986.8
  Tweet Count Range: 0–942,149 18,236.98 41,417.64
 External factors
  Press Headlines Range: 102–565 350.66 132.26
  Google Searches Range: 1–100 32.39 35.50
 Control factors
  Commute Morning 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.11 0.31
  Work 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.30 0.50
  Commute Evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.17 0.39
  Evening 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.25 0.43
  Night 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.16 0.37
  Sunday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.14 0.35
  Monday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.10 0.30
  Tuesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.08 0.27
  Wednesday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.06 0.23
  Thursday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.23 0.42
  Friday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.24 0.43
  Saturday 0 = no; 1 = yes 0.15 0.36
Reduction in N due to removal of retweets, leaving only original tweets.
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computational supervised machine classifier to learn the features of hateful tweets 
towards Black Minority Ethnic (BME) and religious groups following the event, allow-
ing us to distinguish these from more general tweets. The overall precision of the 
classifier was 0.77, well in excess of the recommended 0.70 for scientific research (van 
Rijsbergen 1979). The cyberhate variable entered into the models was coded as 0 = no 
cyberhate; 1 = moderate cyberhate; 2 = extreme cyberhate (see Appendix and Burnap 
and Williams 2015 for more detail on the reliability of the classifier5).
Methods of estimation
Information propagation size model
A zero-inflated negative binomial model was used to fit to the data. This modelling strat-
egy is appropriate where the dependent is skewed and over dispersed, and where there may 
be an excessive amount of zeros (91 per cent of the tweets had a zero count for retweets).
Information propagation survival model
The second dependent—survival—was a measure of the lifetime of an information 
flow. Our interest was to model the factors that affect the survival of information flows 
following the terrorist event through the impact, inventory and early reaction phases 
(Cohen 1972). For example, does expressing hateful content increase or decrease the 
lifetime of an information flow beyond Cohen’s initial impact and inventory phases? 
This question can be posed as one of hazards to survival, thus we adopted Cox’s propor-
tional hazards model (Cox 1972). As the study was bounded by a 15-day data analysis 
window, we were mindful that some information flows may survive the study period. 
Based on previous research, tweets that were posted within 48 hours of the curtailment 
of data analysis were right-censored6 (i.e. the last retweet may not have occurred and we 
assume the information flow to still be active or ‘alive’).
Cyberhate model
As the cyberhate-dependent variable is best described as ordinal, we adopted a general-
ized ordered logit model. This model is not bound by the proportional odds assump-
tion that was violated by our data.
All independent variables were subject to exploration and all outliers were removed 
prior to analysis to ensure the robustness of all models.7 Given the sample size, when inter-
preting the relevance of the various coefficients, we should not be over reliant on tests of 
statistical significance. Therefore, we have used odds ratios and calculated the incidence 
rate ratio (IRR) as measures of the magnitude of associations. The IRR is derived by the 
exponentiation of the negative binomial regression coefficients, allowing for the interpre-
tation of retweet incidence rates (as opposed to logs of expected retweet counts).
5 Direct link to the open access article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.85/epdf.
6 http://www.sysomos.com/insidetwitter/engagement/.
7 The distribution of the extremity of cyberhate-dependent variable showed lower categories were more likely than higher. 
While there is no assumption of normality with ordered logistic regression, the proportional odds assumption must be met. 
As the data did not meet this assumption, we opted for a generalized ordered logit model as an alternative. For robustness, 
the extremity of cyberhate dependent was transformed into a binary variable (no hate/hate) and logistic regression was run. 
Broadly similar results were found to the generalized ordered logit model providing a degree of confidence in our model choice 
and results. In addition to these checks, we used the ‘robust’ command in Stata to obtain robust standard errors mitigating 
against potential data distribution problems.
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Results
Data visualization
Given the uniqueness of the data set, we used the Collaborative Online Social Media 
Observatory (COSMOS) platform for initial visualization (Williams et al. 2011; Burnap 
et al. 2014). Figures 1–3 provide snapshots of the COSMOS Dashboard showing geo-
graphic and temporal distributions of Twitter communications in the 15-day analy-
sis window. As the content of tweets is not directly quotable in academic research,8 
the COSMOS platform allows for the visualization of tweet content in the form of a 
WordCloud that presents an aggregate overview of the thousands of posts, while main-
taining the anonymity and confidentiality of users (see Williams et al. 2013).9 In the 
first hour of data collection (Figure 1), we can identify a relatively sparse geographic 
distribution of Twitter traffic across the United Kingdom (far left) and London (centre 
bottom). This is not unusual given that approximately 1 per cent of Twitter users enable 
their geo-location (Sloan et al. 2013; 2015). Nevertheless, the relative distribution over 
time allows us to monitor the spread of social reaction. The WordCloud (centre top) is 
based on the full Twitter sample in the first hour of analysis (10,080 original tweets), 
not just geo-located data. Therefore, this summary of content provides a window on 
the thousands of original commutations being sent during the initial reaction on social 
media, where size of word represents frequency of use in this period. The content in 
this early stage reflects the act (‘attack’, ‘killing’, ‘murder’, ‘london’), speculation as to 
the perpetrators’ nationalities (‘nigerian’) religious backgrounds and possible motiva-
tion (‘islam’, ‘muslim’, ‘religion’) and is devoid of any details on the victim apart from 
possibly gender (‘man’). The focus on the perpetrator was likely fuelled by the YouTube 
video of the attacker that was uploaded within minutes of the event. Of particular sali-
ence to this paper is the presence of the terms ‘edl’ and ‘hate’. A closer inspection shows 
that the former term was being used to discuss the English Defence League’s (EDL) 
various activities, mostly in a negative tone (e.g. criticism of a speech made by Tommy 
Robinson about Woolwich, and the rejection of an EDL donation to the charity Help 
for Heroes), while the latter term was being used in counter-hate speech tweets (e.g. 
shame on the EDL and British National Party (BNP) for spreading hate), as opposed 
to hateful tweets. Given the relatively low number of hateful tweets compared to the 
overall volume of communications (see below), no racist or religious slurs appear in 
the WordCloud. This initial hour of the study window, characterized by a lack of firm 
details and a degree of speculation, is akin to Cohen’s (1972: 22) impact stage in which 
citizens display an ‘unorganised response to the death, injury and destruction’.
Figure 2 is a snapshot of the first four days in the study window. What is immediately 
apparent is the geo-tagged communications are more voluminous and widespread across 
the United Kingdom, with concentration in line with population density (Sloan et al. 
2013). London emerges as a hotspot for communications around the event, in particular 
8 Twitter Terms of Service forbid the anonymization of tweet content (screen-name must always accompany tweet content), 
meaning that ethically, informed consent should be sought from each tweeter to quote their post in research outputs. However, 
this is impractical given the number of posts generated and the difficulty in establishing contact (a direct private message can 
only be sent on Twitter if both parties follow each other). Therefore, it is not ethical to directly quote tweets that identify indi-
viduals without prior consent.
9 Tweets from public organizations, such as government departments and police services, are deemed quotable as no indi-
vidual can be identified.
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the Woolwich region. The WordCloud (133,275 original tweets) shows the content of com-
munications has shifted from disorganized speculation to specific details on the identity 
of the victim (‘lee’, ‘rigby’, ‘drummer’), a perpetrator (‘michael’, ‘adebolajo’) and the pro-
gress of the case (‘arrested’). This more organized form of communication resonates with 
Cohen’s inventory stage, where the mass media begin to play a central role, communicat-
ing to citizens the ‘preliminary picture’ of the event. However, in our case, it is worthy 
of note that the identity of both perpetrators was broadcast on Twitter hours ahead of 
conventional media. Figure 3 is a snapshot of the final three days of the study window. The 
geo-tagged communications plots represent the full 15 days and the cumulative volume of 
data now allows us to plot a more complete picture of the national social response, where 
we can observe dense clusters around London, the Midlands and Manchester (Lee Rigby’s 
family home). The WordCloud (11,399 original tweets) shows Twitter communications 
have shifted from the specific details (victim, perpetrator, case status) onto boarder issues 
linked to the event (‘british’, ‘muslims’, ‘islam’, ‘religion’, ‘terrorism’, ‘media’, ‘edl’, ‘cam-
eron’). This shift was possibly influenced by widespread media converge of the speeches 
made by David Cameron and Tony Blair in the latter stages of the study window. Cameron’s 
mention of the EDL in his speech (Cabinet Office 2013) is partly responsible for their pres-
ence in the WordCloud, while the presence of ‘terrorism’ for the first time is likely due to 
the use of the term in conjunction with radicalization and Islam in the speech by Tony 
Blair (Thompson 2013). This shift towards the broader issues related to the event is akin to 
Cohen’s reaction stage, where the images emerging in the inventory are ‘crystallized into 
more organised opinions and attitudes’. The potential influence of the media in ‘transmit-
ting the images’ and ‘setting the agenda’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii) throughout these various 
stages is investigated later in the paper. In the following sections, we scope in from this 
‘10,000 foot view’ of the data by modelling the specific enablers and inhibiters of hateful 
and non-hateful information propagation following the event.
Cyberhate model
Of the 210,807 original tweets posted about the terrorist event in the 15 days follow-
ing, 1,878 tweets (1 per cent) were identified by the validated supervised machine 
classifier (Burnap and Williams 2015) as containing BME or religious hate-related 
terms at the moderate (e.g. ‘send them home’, ‘deport them’, etc.) or extreme (e.g. 
‘niggers’, ‘muslim scum’) level. This shows that event-specific cyberhate targeted towards 
the perpetrators and BME and religious groups associated with them was present in 
social media communications following the Woolwich terrorist attack, supporting the 
first hypothesis (H1).10 The targeted nature of the cyberhate (e.g. containing the term 
Woolwich) demonstrates that the attack acted as an antecedent trigger event, galva-
nizing tensions and sentiments against groups that shared similar characteristics to 
the suspected perpetrators. This is the first evidence to suggest spikes in hate crimes 
and incidents following such events are not confided to offline settings (Legewie 2013; 
Hanes and Machin 2014; King and Sutton 2014). Table 2 details the results of the 
10 As we did not collect data before the event (as the schedules of terrorists are not made public knowledge), we cannot verify 
that this amount of cyberhate is an increase on the pre-event condition Twitter data could be purchased from a vendor (e.g. GNIP 
or DataSift) in an attempt to verify this hypothesis. However, the deletion of cyberhate tweets from this data set by perpetrators 
themselves and by Twitter as a result of complaints made by victims, means these purchased data sets are inaccurate reflections of 
the social media response to events. Our data set was not subject to deletions of this kind as we collected in real time.
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generalized ordered logit model predicting production and extremity of cyberhate. 
Other Agent was entered as a reference category given their volume in the data set 
(94 per cent) and their proclivity to produce cyberhate (these agents produced 95 
per cent of the cyberhate in the data set). The majority of Twitter users in this cat-
egory were members of the ‘digital public’. Of the alternative agents identified in the 
data set, only Far Right Political Agents emerged as significantly associated with the 
production of cyberhate, supporting hypothesis H2. Political organizations (e.g. BNP, 
EDL) and party members made up the minority of these agents, with more general 
far right identifying groups and individuals making up the majority. Proportionally, 
compared to Other Agents, the odds of producing cyberhate on Twitter were three 
times larger for these agents following the terrorist event. A closer inspection of the 
tweets produced by these agents reveals that it was the more general far right identify-
ing groups and individuals who produced cyberhate and mostly at a moderate level 
(e.g. ‘send them home’). The odds for including hashtags were higher for cyberhate 
Table 2 Generalized ordered logit regression predicting production and extremity of cyberhate
Coef. SE OR
Content factors
 Sentiment 0.139 0.032 1.149
 Hashtag 0.688* 0.048 1.990
 URL −0.893* 0.049 0.409
Social factors
 News Agent 0.134 0.112 1.144
 Police Agent −3.479 0.34 0.000
 Political Agent 0.009 0.337 1.009
 Far Right Political Agent 1.333* 0.458 3.793
  Ref: Other Agent
 Tweet Count −0.007 0.038 0.993
External factors
 Press Headlines 0.003* 0.000 1.003
 Google Searches −0.007 0.002 0.993
Control factors
 Commute Morning 0.597* 0.093 1.817
 Work 0.321* 0.081 1.378
 Commute Evening 0.041 0.097 1.041
 Evening 0.516* 0.083 1.675
  Ref: Night
 Sunday −0.409* 0.120 0.664
 Monday 0.054 0.116 1.056
 Tuesday 0.222 0.121 1.248
 Thursday −0.190 0.146 0.827
 Friday −0.983* 0.150 0.374
 Saturday −0.058 0.112 0.944
  Ref: Wednesday (day of attack)
Model fit
Log likelihood −10,823
Chi-square 945.46
Sig. 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.04
Na 210,807
aReduction due to removal of retweets, leaving only original tweets.
*p < 0.01.
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tweets, while they were lower for containing URLs. This may suggest those wishing to 
promote hateful content online and sensitize others to minority groups in society via 
contagion use hashtags to enhance the discoverability of their content. Conversely, 
URLs are possibly less common in hateful tweets given linked content (most often a 
popular media source) is unlikely to corroborate racist opinion and biased speculative 
rumours. The positive association between a rise in news headlines about the event 
and cyberhate tweets evidences the link (albeit relatively weak) between old and new 
media, supporting hypothesis H3. The odds of the production of extreme cyberhate 
increased by a magnitude of 1.3 for every 100 additional news headlines produced. 
During early stages following the event (e.g. impact and inventory), tweeters may be 
fuelled by coverage in the press who have a role in ‘setting the agenda’ and ‘transmit-
ting the images’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii), especially those who wish to spread hate, biased 
rumours and speculation.
Information propagation size model
Table 3 reports the results from the information propagation size model. The most 
novel and salient finding was that tweets containing cyberhate were negatively asso-
ciated with the size of information flows emanating from the Woolwich terrorist 
event. None of these tweets were statistically likely to form large information flows 
following the event. Tweets containing hate terms were 45 per cent less likely to be 
retweeted as compared to tweets not containing such content (IRR 0.55). Figure 4 
shows that original and retweeted cyberhate peaked during the early stages following 
the event (impact stage) and sharply declined over the four days following (inventory 
stage), providing evidence in support of hypothesis H4.11 Given that terrorist events 
have been shown to increase levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (Legewie 2013) and 
hate crimes and incidents offline (Hanes and Machin 2014; King and Sutton 2014), 
it is surprising to find a lack of cyberhate propagation in terms of size following the 
Woolwich attack. In line with this finding, we found that positive sentiment increased 
the retweet IRR by a factor of 1.38. Therefore, tweets containing positive words and 
phrases (e.g. ‘warm wishes to the family of Lee Rigby’, ‘brave family’, ‘respect for 
armed forces’, etc.) as opposed to negative words or phrases were 38 per cent more 
likely to form large information flows.
Finally, type of agent emerged as significant, further supporting hypothesis H6. 
Compared to the reference category Other Agent, tweets emanating from News Agents 
were more likely to be retweeted by a factor of 4.3, providing evidence to support the 
notion that traditional media messages maintain their role in ‘setting the agenda’ and 
‘transmitting the images’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii) in the age of social media. Police Agents 
were also more likely to be retweeted by a factor of 5.7. The first finding is novel and 
shows for the first time that Twitter users propagate police tweets following terrorist 
events in the United Kingdom. It is evident that users are sharing police requests 
for information (e.g. metpoliceuk: ‘We are appealing for anyone who may have wit-
nessed the incident in #Woolwich to contact us via the Anti-Terrorist Hotline’), case 
updates (e.g. metpoliceuk: ‘Two men aged 22 and 28 arrested on suspicion of murder 
11 The peak in moderate cyberhate six days into the study window is associated with the EDL march in London.
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remain in hospital in a stable condition #woolwich’) and general commentary (e.g. 
PoliceFedICC: ‘EDL marches on Newcastle as attacks on Muslims increase tenfold 
in the wake of Woolwich machete attack’).12 Evidence from the United States sug-
gests this pattern of Twitter user behaviour was also evident following the Boston 
Marathon terrorist attack (Davis et  al. 2014). The finding that Far Right Political 
Agents were the least likely to have content retweeted is consistent with the previous 
finding in relation to cyberhate.
Table 3 Zero-inflated negative binomial regression predicting counts of retweets (size model)
Coef. SE IRR
Content factors
 Cyberhate −0.604** 0.017 1.721
 Sentiment 0.322** 0.018 1.380
 Hashtag 0.217** 0.025 1.242
 URL 0.438** 0.026 1.551
Social factors
 News Agent 1.460** 0.044 4.304
 Police Agent 1.742** 0.408 5.708
 Political Agent 0.670** 0.150 1.954
 Far Right Political Agent 0.632* 0.327 1.882
  Ref: Other Agent
 Tweet Count −0.215** 0.00 1.000
External factors
 Press Headlines 0.000* 0.000 1.000
 Google Searches 0.005** 0.001 1.005
Control factors
 TimeLagRT5 0.000** 0.000 1.000
 Commute Morning 0.030 0.048 1.030
 Work 0.014 0.038 1.015
 Commute Evening 0.074 0.045 1.077
 Evening −0.010 0.040 0.990
  Ref: Night
 Sunday −0.133** 0.041 0.875
 Monday −0.302** 0.047 0.739
 Tuesday −0.344** 0.051 0.709
 Thursday −0.365** 0.044 0.733
 Friday −0.311** 0.044 0.733
 Saturday −0.122** 0.052 0.853
  Ref: Wednesday (day of attack)
Binomial model (Inflation/Excess Zeros)
 Number of Followers −0.899** 0.017
 Constant 4.586 0.063
Model fit
Log likelihood −92,196.36
Chi-square 2,594.57
Sig. p = 0.00
LRT for alpha = 0 p = 0.00
Vuong Z = 45.00, p = 0.00
Na 210,807
aReduction due to removal of retweets, leaving only original tweets.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
12 Usernames and text reproduced here as the tweet accounts belong to public organizations, i.e. the Metropolitan Police and 
the Police Federation.
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Survival model
A positive estimate in the Cox regression model (Table 4) is interpreted as increasing 
hazards to survival and therefore reduces the duration of the information flow. In 
support of hypothesis H5, cyberhate is negatively associated with long-lasting infor-
mation flows, emerging as having the highest positive hazard ratio (1.19) of the vari-
ables of interest. Supporting hypothesis H6, News Agents emerged as significantly 
negatively associated with hazards to survival, indicating tweets from such agents 
were likely to last longer in the study period. Counter intuitively, Far Right Political 
Agents emerged as having the second highest negative hazard ratio, after Police 
Agents, indicating that information flows emanating from these types of agents were 
likely to outlast those emanating from other agents at some point in the 15-day 
analysis window. To better aid interpretation, we used Kaplan–Meier (KM) survival 
estimation to plot the survival functions of cyberhate and Agent Type. Figure 5 illus-
trates the comparative survival rates of cyberhate information flows, showing that 
flows containing extreme BME or religious hate terms die out rapidly, between 20 
and 24 hours following the event. Tweets containing moderate BME or religious hate 
terms last a little longer, between 36 and 42 hours before dying out. Tweets contain-
ing no cyberhate show a longer survival curve. This evidence confirms that extreme 
cyberhate was propagated in social media networks following this event in the imme-
diate impact stage, which was then replaced with the propagation of moderate cyber-
hate in the inventory stage, and finally little or no propagation of cyberhate in the 
early reaction phase (Cohen 1972). This sharp de-escalation resonates with the work 
Fig. 4 Frequency of cyberhate during the analysis window.
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of Legewie (2013) and King and Sutton (2014) who postulate that the increase in 
offline anti-immigration sentiment and hate crimes and incidents following terror-
ist events has a half-life. It seems likely that this offline pattern is replicated online 
in social media networks. Figure  6 represents the KM survival estimates plot for 
Agent Type. It is evident that information flows emanating from Far Right Political 
Agents outlast all other agent types up to 36–42 hours after the event, at which point 
they lose ground to News Agents, whose information flows last the longest (excus-
ing Other Agent). The survivability of tweets emanating from Police Agents in the 
first 24-hour window and their subsequent demise at around 36 hours is a novel and 
policy-relevant finding. Why the Far Right and Police are so dominant in terms of 
information flow survival in the early stages of the reaction to this terrorist event is 
explored further in the next section.
Table 4 Cox regression predicting hazards to tweet survival (survival model)
Coef. SE Hazard ratio
Content factors
 Cyberhate 0.171** 0.073 1.186
 Sentiment −0.041** 0.011 0.960
 Hashtag −0.049** 0.016 0.952
 URL −0.437** 0.017 0.646
Social factors
 Number of Followers 0.000** 0.000 1.000
 News Agent −0.082** 0.030 0.922
 Police Agent −0.572* 0.268 0.565
 Political Agent −0.112 0.088 0.894
 Far Right Political Agent −0.417** 0.148 0.659
  Ref: Other Agent
 Tweet Count 0.062** 0.013 1.064
External factors
 Press Headlines 0.001** 0.000 1.001
 Google Searches −0.001* 0.001 0.999
Control factors
 TimeLagRT5 0.000** 0.000 1.000
 Commute Morning 0.163** 0.032 1.117
 Work 0.210** 0.025 1.233
 Commute Evening 0.252** 0.029 1.287
 Evening 0.201** 0.027 1.105
  Ref: Night
 Sunday 0.252** 0.045 1.287
 Monday 0.216** 0.048 1.242
 Tuesday 0.060 0.050 1.062
 Thursday 0.213** 0.055 1.237
 Friday 0.056 0.052 1.057
 Saturday 0.099* 0.045 1.105
  Ref: Wednesday (day of attack)
Model fit
Log likelihood −152,650.40
Chi-square 1,473.47
Sig. p = 0.00
Na 210,807
aReduction due to removal of retweets, leaving only original tweets.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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Discussion
In this paper, we evidenced how a fine-grained temporal analysis of locomotive social 
media data, supported by computational criminological methods, can reveal how an 
antecedent trigger terrorist event is related to an observable public social media reac-
tion. We interpreted these social media communications via an application of Cohen’s 
four-stage process of action and reaction. In support of hypotheses H1 and H2, via our 
bespoke hate speech supervised machine classifier (see Burnap and Williams 2015), 
we found evidence of cyberhate originating from individual Twitter users, in particu-
lar those identifying with right wing political groups, that was directly related to the 
trigger event. The correlation between the prevalence of far right political groups and 
individuals within social media networks and the production of cyberhate in the early 
stages post event, while unsurprising, is a novel empirical finding. These findings extend 
work that shows terrorists events result in a spike in offline hate crimes and incidents, 
by demonstrating cyberhate also spiked in the immediate aftermath of the Woolwich 
attack (Legewie 2013; Hanes and Machin 2014; King and Sutton 2014). The rapid spike 
in racial and religious cyberhate in the immediate aftermath of Woolwich is not sur-
prising. In the second edition of moral panics, Cohen (1987) introduced the notion of 
‘symbols of trouble’, and in the third edition, Cohen (2002) outlined clusters of social 
identity that he considered predictable symbols, including ethnic and religious minori-
ties. He shows through socio-linguistic analysis that the press conflates these minorities 
with violence. Therefore, we might argue immigration, race and religion have become 
a warning sign for the real, much deeper threat of terrorism. The fanning of the flames 
on social media by individuals identifying with right-wing political groups, bolstered 
by traditional press coverage (we saw the correlation of news headlines and cyberhate 
in our model), further promotes these spurious connections and the propagation of 
cyberhate. The religious and racial dimension of the targeted cyberhate is potentially 
problematic if we are to assume, as Cohen did, that the social response to events is 
partly responsible for deepening its impact or causing new events through the cyclical 
process of action, reaction and amplification. Given the force-amplifier effect of social 
media and the role it may play in solidifying the crowd and validating sentiments and 
tensions, opening up a potential space for the galvanizing and spread of hostile beliefs, 
we next explored its possible contagion effect fuelled by ‘rumours and the milling pro-
cess’ (1972: 19).
Having established that cyberhate did emerge in social media in response to the 
Woolwich event, we set out to investigate if it propagated via hypotheses H4 and H5. 
Our size and survival models allowed us to determine the escalation, duration, diffu-
sion and de-escalation of cyberhate and non-cyberhate information flows during the 
impact, inventory and reaction stages following the terrorist trigger event. Our analy-
sis revealed that while information flows containing cyberhate peaked in the impact 
stage following the event, a sharp decline was evident during the inventory stage. Our 
size and survival models confirmed that information flows containing cyberhate were 
significantly less likely to grow large and survive for long periods during the study win-
dow. These results lend support to the notion that terrorist events act as triggers for 
the production of cyberhate, possibly facilitated by ‘rumours and the milling processs’ 
(Cohen 1972: 19) that characterize the impact stage and that this type of event-specific 
cyberhate is relatively short term and conditional upon certain factors. The ‘half-life’ of 
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cyberhate mirrors research into offline event-related hate crimes and incidents (Legewie 
2013; King and Sutton 2014). Perhaps the more salient of the conditional factors is 
the correlation between offline newspaper headlines and the propagation of informa-
tion shown in all three models, supporting hypothesis H3. The number of newspaper 
headlines was predictive of the production of cyberhate, evidencing that tweeters post-
ing hateful content may be fuelled by coverage in the press in the early impact stage, 
lending support to Cohen’s argument above. Number of headlines was also predictive 
of the size of information flow, while News Agent type was predictive of survival of 
information flow (outlasting all but Other Agent in the analysis window). This study is 
the first to evidence the prima facie plausible relationship between new and old media 
in the context of social reactions to criminal events, and it lends support to the classic 
criminological notion that old media retains a significant role in ‘setting the agenda’ 
and ‘transmitting the images’ (Cohen 2002: xxiii) following crisis situations.
The dominance of actor type in all three models warrants further attention, particu-
larly the ways in which information flows from these actors shape social reaction online. 
Despite the positive correlation between the number of press headlines and cyberhate 
in the early impact phase, we might postulate that the dominance of the traditional 
media effect in the inventory and reaction phases, as shown in the Model 3 and the KM 
on Agent Type estimation (Figure 6), is partly responsible for the reduction of cyberhate 
beyond the impact stage, counteracting its association with the production of cyberhate 
in the impact stage. It is clear from the WordCloud in Figure 6 that the two media stories 
on the Cameron and Blair speeches dominated Twitter activity during the latter stages 
of the study window, moving information flows onto wider contextual issues, in keeping 
with Cohen’s reaction phase. It is therefore plausible that traditional media narratives in 
the inventory stage shape the preliminary picture of what has happened, closing down 
the possible spaces for the contagion of hateful and antagonistic sentiment fuelled by 
the unorganized response to death, speculation and rumour indicative of the impact 
stage. However, it is important to note that the media alone cannot be responsible for 
the reduction in cyberhate and that other agents are likely to play a part. In particular, 
information flows emanating from Police Agents within the first 24 hours of the study 
window showed high survival rates, above News Agents. As shown earlier, a portion of 
these police information flows contained case updates, helping dispel rumour and spec-
ulation. Social media affords Police Agents with a direct line of communication with 
citizens, bypassing the usual mass media filter—opening up possibilities to influence 
public opinion around events (Williams et al. 2013). However, the dominance of tradi-
tional media and police information flows during the impact and early inventory stage 
was accompanied by small (in terms of size as determined by retweeting volume) but sus-
tained information flows emanating from far right political groups and individuals. The 
small but sustained nature of these flows indicates that there is limited endorsement of 
these twitter narratives, but where there is support it emanates from core group who 
seek out each other’s messages over time. Therefore, contagion of cyberhate informa-
tion flows is contained and unlikely to spread widely beyond such groups. Furthermore, 
preliminary analysis not covered here evidences the presence of counter-cyberhate 
speech following the terrorist event. These narratives from Twitter users either directly 
or indirectly challenge cyberhate. It remains to be seen if such self-regulation in social 
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media networks represents a form of responsibilization that can lighten the burden of 
policing the ‘cyber-streets’ (Williams et al. 2013; Giannasi 2014).
Conclusion
The connection between events and the production and propagation of cyberhate 
is mostly anecdotal. The rapid uptake of social media has resulted in a massive 
distributed social sensor net that affords criminologists with the opportunity to 
identify, monitor and trace social reactions to events to the second in real time. 
This unprecedented level of detail in data affords hate crime researchers with the 
ability to detect cyberhate in the aftermath of antecedent trigger events, such as 
the Woolwich terror attack much more rapidly than is achievable with conven-
tional data. In this paper, we have shown the temporal variation in cyberhate that 
relates to concepts at the core of much criminological theory, such as the esca-
lation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of crime. If, as Cohen suggests, the 
social response to events is partly responsible for deepening its impact or causing 
new events through the cyclical process of action, reaction and amplification, then 
social media has the potential to act as a force amplifier. With respect to escala-
tion, we showed how social media opens up a new digital ‘public agora’ for the 
mass production, consumption and spread of social reaction in relation to trigger 
events. Part of this event triggered ‘amplified’ social reaction is deviant in nature, 
and this study showed for the first time that the production of cyberhate is evident 
within the first few hours following the terrorist event. Drawing on Cohen’s pro-
cess of action, reaction and amplification, we identified this period as the ‘impact 
stage’, characterized by the unorganized response to death, rumour and specula-
tion. These characteristics, accompanied by a ‘terrestrial’ paced police response to 
dispel speculation, open up a space for the initial production of unfettered preju-
dice and hate towards groups that are assumed to share similar characteristics with 
the suspected perpetrators. Our study of diffusion and duration evidenced that the 
spread of cyberhate was inhibited beyond the impact stage, with any sustenance 
likely due to the actions of a core group of far right political actors in the social 
media network. As in research into the temporal dimension of offline hate crime 
(Legewie 2013; King and Sutton 2014), it was apparent that cyberhate also had a 
‘half-life’, evidenced by the rapid de-escalation post impact, and a near absence in 
the reaction stage. We postulated that dominance of traditional media and police 
information flows during the inventory and reaction stages, during which specula-
tion gives way to facts about the case and finally to a focus on the wider issues, may 
be partly responsible for this half-life of cyberhate in social media networks. We 
also found initial evidence of counter-cyberhate speech in the data set, suggesting 
a form of responsibilization. However, confirming either of these postulations was 
beyond the scope of the data and this paper and future research should seek to 
explore these potential relationships further. If such causal associations do exists 
then the relationship between the media and the public during the course of reac-
tions to events may be more variable than previously theorized.
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Given the recent criminal justice response to cyberhate and incitement cases, our 
findings have several potential operational and policy implications. First, the ability to 
observe a large portion of the population13 in near real time via social media networks 
provides those responsible for ensuring the safety of the public a new window onto mass 
social reactions. Evidence from this paper shows that deviant reactions, in the form of 
cyberhate in our case, can form part of a social reaction in relation to a trigger event. 
Therefore, these technologies may act as early warning systems for the amplification 
of deviance beyond the event itself. Second, the ‘half-life’ of cyberhate and its rapid 
de-escalation following the first 24 hours of the antecedent event suggests practitioners 
need to focus their interventions within this impact stage to increase the rate of de-
escalation further. Third, the dominance of traditional media and police information 
flows in social media indicates these are likely effective channels for the countering of 
rumour, speculation and hate.
We end this paper with a methodological note. The majority of those currently 
under 20 years of age in the Western world were ‘born digital’ and will not recall a 
time without access to the Internet. Combined with the migration of the ‘born ana-
logue’ generation onto the Internet, fuelled by the rise of social media, we have seen 
the exponential growth of online spaces for the mass sharing of opinions and senti-
ments, many of them characterized by volatility and a lack of regulation. These online 
spaces represent a socio-technical assemblage that creates a new public sphere ena-
bling digital citizenship (Mossberger 2008) through which aspects of civil society are 
played out. No study of contemporary society can ignore this dimension of social life. 
Social media presents researchers with a rich new form of data from which criminolo-
gists, assisted by computational methods, can extract meaningful insights into con-
temporary social processes at unprecedented scale and speed. How we marshal these 
new forms of data is a key challenge for the social sciences. ‘Computational criminol-
ogy’ may remain on the fringes of our discipline for some time yet, but we believe it is 
now worth considering the addition of ‘computer science’ to the list of disciplines with 
which criminology liaises to address contemporary forms of crime such as cyberhate.
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Appendix: Computational Methods Used to Derive the Extremity of Cyberhate Variable
To classify the extremity of cyberhate from the collected Twitter data, we built a super-
vised machine learning classifier in the Weka tool to distinguish between hateful and/
or antagonistic responses with a focus on race, ethnicity, religion and more general 
responses, following the event. To validate the machine classifier, we established a gold 
standard data set of human coded annotations. We sampled 2,000 tweets to be human 
coded and coders were provided with each tweet and the question: ‘is this text offen-
sive or antagonistic in terms of race ethnicity or religion?’ They were presented with a 
ternary set of classes—yes, no, undecided. We utilized the CrowdFlower online service 
that allows for Human Intelligence Tasks, such as coding text into classes, to be distrib-
uted over multiple workers. We implemented the Stanford Lexical Parser (Marneffe 
et al. 2006), along with a context-free lexical parsing model, to extract typed depend-
encies within the tweet text. Typed dependencies provide a representation of syntactic 
grammatical relationships in a sentence (or tweet in this case) that can be used as 
features for classification. A ten-fold cross-validation approach was used to train and 
test the supervised machine learning method. It functions by iteratively training the 
classifier with features from 90 per cent of the human coded data set and classifying 
the remaining 10 per cent as ‘unseen’ data, based on the features evident in the cases it 
has encountered in the training data. Validation results suggested that overall the most 
efficient features for classifying cyberhate were n-gram typed dependencies combined 
with n-gram hateful and antagonistic terms. In fact, the hateful terms alone achieved 
the same precision performance but had a lower performance for recall. The number 
of false negative results (missed instances of cyber hate) was 7 per cent higher when 
using hateful terms alone. This is an interesting result as it provides evidence to suggest 
that human annotators identify hateful or antagonistic content on Twitter that does 
not necessarily contain hateful or antagonistic terms and requires a more nuanced 
representation of what is deemed cyber hate when aiming to classify tweets. For further 
details on the machine classification results and a full evaluation of the process, please 
see the open access article here: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.85/
epdf.
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